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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Dupree Lamar Meadows appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of burglary, felony concealment of evidence, 
and obstructing a police officer, and the trial court finding that he is a persistent 
violator of the law. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Dallas Fredrickson and his girlfriend, Josephine Ziady, hosted a party at 
their Coeur d'Alene home. (Tr., 1 p.48, L.2 - p.51. L.12; p.92, Ls.2-7.) Ziady and 
Chase Pappell, a party attendee, went outside to smoke. (Tr., p.54, Ls.8-13.) 
From the front of the house, they saw Dupree Meadows, who had left the party 
approximately fifteen to twenty minutes earlier, standing near Fredrickson's truck. 
(Tr., p.54, L.2 - p.56, L.11.) They saw papers on the ground near the truck, and 
Meadows reaching down to pick them up. (Tr., p.55, L.23 - p.57, L.5.) 
Finding Meadows' actions suspicious, Ziady returned to the party and told 
Fredrickson what she saw. (Tr., p.57, L.24 - p.58, L.9.) Fredrickson and Ziady 
went to Fredrickson's vehicle and noticed that several items were missing, 
including CDs, a CD player, the bulb of a gift-boxed flower, papers from 
Fredrickson's glove box, a floor jack, a bandana, and a toolbox. (Tr., p.58, L.20 -
1 The appellate record contains two reporter's transcripts. In this brief, the 
Respondent refers to the transcript that contains the motion to suppress hearing, 
the jury trial and the sentencing hearing as "Tr.," and the transcript that contains 
the voir dire, opening statements, and closing arguments, as "Augmented Tr." 
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p.59, L.23; p.79, L.25 - p.80, L.25; Tr., p.94, Ls.1-16.) Fredrickson and Ziady 
went to Meadows' apartment complex and found Meadows' vehicle in the parking 
lot there. (Tr., p.61, Ls.1-20; p.95, L.14 - p.96, L.6.) Looking into the vehicle, 
Fredrickson and Ziady were able to see some of the items that were missing 
from Fredrickson's truck. (Tr., p.61, L.21 - p.62, L.1 0; p.97, Ls.4-11.) 
Fredrickson then contacted the Coeur d'Alene police. (Tr., p.98, Ls.1-11.) 
After speaking with Fredrickson and looking at the items in Meadows' 
vehicle, the responding officers knocked on Meadows' apartment door. (Tr., 
p.98, L.12- p.99, L.12; p.150, L.12- p.152, L.7; p.165, Ls.9-13.) Meadows gave 
the officers permission to enter, but asked them to stay in the entryway of the 
apartment. (Tr., p.170, L.10 - p.171, L.1.) The officers questioned Meadows, 
but he denied involvement in the theft of items from Fredrickson's truck. (Tr., 
p.192, Ls.16-24.) 
Meadows was agitated and yelling. (Tr., p.171, L.5 - p.172, L.20; p.219, 
Ls.2-24.) Eventually, the officers told Meadows he was under arrest, but 
Meadows refused to comply with orders to turn around and place his hands 
behind his back, and instead sat down on his sofa. (Tr., p.172, Ls.13-18; p.220, 
Ls.1-14.) After threatening to use a taser, the officers were able to arrest 
Meadows. (Tr., p.172, L.19 - p.173. L.2.) While in handcuffs, and prior to being 
put in the patrol car, Meadows pulled away from one of the arresting officers and 
tried to throw himself down on the ground. (Tr., p.173, Ls.7-20; p.220, L.25 -
p.221, L.14.) 
2 
After Meadows' arrest, Fredrickson and the officers found items belonging 
to Fredrickson, including academic transcripts, bills, and a photo of his dog, in an 
the apartment complex community dumpster. (Tr., p.102, Ls.13-20; p.105, L.25 
- p.109, L.10; p.154, L.14 - p.158, L.25.) Officers took photographs of 
Fredrickson's property that was viewable inside Meadows' vehicle. (Tr., p.102, 
L.21 - p.105, L.24.) The next day, the officers obtained a search warrant to 
search Meadows' vehicle and recovered Fredrickson's property that was inside. 
(R., Vol. I, pp.64-66; Tr., p.176, Ls.11-14; p.234, L.1-p.237, L.18.) 
The state charged Meadows with burglary, felony concealment of 
evidence, obstructing a police officer, and the persistent violator sentencing 
enhancement. (R., Vol. II, pp.235-237.) Meadows filed a motion to suppress, 
alleging that the responding officers lacked probable cause to arrest Meadows, 
and that the officers did not comply with Meadows' revocation of consent to be in 
the apartment. (R., Vol. I, pp.105-106; Vol. II, pp.177-187.) After a hearing, the 
district court denied the motion, concluding that the officers had probable cause 
to arrest Fredrickson for burglary, and that a reasonable person would not have 
understood any of Meadows' comments to the officer as revoking consent to be 
in his apartment. (R., Vol. II, pp.188-192.) 
A jury found Meadows guilty of all charges. (R., Vol. II, pp.319-320.) After 
Meadows waived his right to a jury trial for the persistent violator sentencing 
enhancement, the district court found that the enhancement applied and that 
Meadows was a persistent violator of the law. (Tr., p.273, L.11 - p.280, L.14.) 
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The district court entered concurrent sentences of two years fixed and 14 years 
indeterminate on both the burgiary and felony concealment of evidence charges, 
and a concurrent 180 days in jail on the obstructing an officer charge. (R., Vol. ii, 
pp.332-337.) The district court ran all sentences concurrent with a separate Ada 




Meadows states the issues on appeal as: 
1. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE POLICE 
EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE CONSENT WHEN 
THEY ENTERED FURTHER INTO THE APARTMENT TO 
ARREST APPELLANT AND/OR THE CONSENT TO 
POLICE ENTRY INTO THE RESIDENCE HAD BEEN 
REVOKED 
2. WHETHER THERE WAS INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE THAT 
MR. MEADOWS HAD THE REQUISITE SPECIFIC INTENT 
FOR THE CONCEALING EVIDENCE CHARGE, OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, THE FACTS WHICH ENHANCED THE 
MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE TO A FELONY WERE NEVER 
CHARGED AND WERE NOT FOUND BY THE JURY 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT IN VIOLATION OF 
APPRENOI 
3. WHETHER THE OBSTRUCTING AN OFFICER JURY 
INSTRUCTION CONSTITUTED A FATAL VARIANCE 
SINCE IT INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON A DIFFERENT 
METHOD OF COMMITTING THE OFFENSE THAN HAD 
BEEN CHARGED 
(Appellant's brief, p.8 (capitalization in original).) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
1. Has Meadows failed to show that the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress? 
2. Has Meadows failed to show that the evidence supporting his 
conviction for felony concealment of evidence was insufficient to prove 
his guilt? 
3. Has Meadows failed to show that the district court utilized facts not found 
by the jury to increase the statutory maximum penalty for the concealing 
evidence charge in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey? 
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4. Has Meadows failed to meet his burden of establishing he is entitled to 
relief based upon his unpreserved due process claim of a variance 





Meadows Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Meadows contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress evidence associated with his arrest. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-14.) 
Specifically, Meadows argues that the district court erred in concluding that he 
did not effectively revoke the consent he gave the responding officers to enter his 
apartment. (Id.) Meadows also argues, for the first time on appeal, that the 
responding officers exceeded the scope of Meadows' consent by arresting him in 
the living room. (Id.) 
However, the record reveals that the district court properly concluded that 
Meadows failed to show that he unequivocally revoked the consent. Further, 
Meadows has failed to preserve for appellate review his claim that the officers 
exceeded the scope of the consent. Finally, any error is harmless because even 
if Meadows could show that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, no 
evidence subject to his suppression motion was admitted at trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
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reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded That Meadows Did Not Revoke His 
Consent 
"Although a warrantless entry or search of a residence is generally illegal 
and violative of the Fourth Amendment, such an entry or search may be 
rendered reasonable by an individual's consent." State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 
695, 978 P.2d 881, 883 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 
522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704,707,963 P.2d 
387, 390 (Ct. App. 1998)). 
Consent, freely and voluntarily given, may be revoked, thereby terminating 
the authority of the police to continue the warrantless search. Staatz, 132 Idaho 
at 696, 978 P.2d at 884 (citing State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 560, 716 P.2d 
1328, 1332 (Ct. App. 1986)). However, "[e]ffective withdrawal of consent 
requires unequivocal conduct, in the form of either an act, statement, or some 
combination of the two, that is inconsistent with the consent to the search 
previously given." Burton v. United States, 657 A.2d 741, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
This is because equivocal conduct can be construed in many different ways and, 
therefore, does not pass muster under an objective reasonableness test. &_; 
accord United States v. Alfaro, 935 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir. 1991 ); Nebraska v. 
French, 279 N.W.2d 116, 119-120 (Neb. 1979); Lawrence v. Virginia, 435 S.E.2d 
591, 595 (Va. 1993). 
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The standard for measuring the scope of consent under the Fourth 
Amendment, including whether consent has been unequivocally revoked, is that 
of objective reasonableness, i.e., "what would the typical reasonable person have 
understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect." Staatz, 132 
Idaho at 697, 978 P.2d at 884; Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991); 
State v. Frizzel, 132 Idaho 522, 523, 975 P.2d 1187, 1188 (Ct. App. 1999). In 
this case, applying the correct legal standards, the district court properly 
concluded that Meadows had failed to show an effective revocation of consent. 
Meadows acknowledges that he initially consented to the officer's entry 
into his apartment. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-12.) However, Meadows contends 
that he revoked that consent prior to his arrest. (Id.) Meadows appears to assert 
that the following exchange, which occurred during Meadows' cross-examination 
of the responding officer at the motion to suppress hearing, evidenced his 
revocation of consent: 
Q: Now, did Mr. Meadows or [Meadows' girlfriend] ever ask you 
to leave or do anything like that? 
A: At one point Mr. Meadows became so agitated that he 
started saying, "I didn't invite you into the house." He was 
more concerned about calling 911, because we were there 
trying to get the number for internal affairs, than paying 
attention to what was going on or trying to listen to us 
explain why were there. 
(Tr., p.28, L.23 - p.29, L.6.) 
In its written opinion and order denying Meadows' motion to suppress, the 
district court concluded that Meadows' comments and demeanor, described by 
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the officer, did not constitute an unequivocal revocation of consent. The court 
explained: 
Defendant argues that he revoked his consent when he 
allegedly "attempted to disengage from further warrantless actions 
by police officers from the same agency." Defendant does not 
explain the factual basis for this allegation. Perhaps defendant has 
in mind his characterization of Officer Buhl's testimony [from the 
motion to suppress hearing], where defendant states [in his brief in 
support of the motion to suppress]: "Officer Buhl stated Meadows 
become agitated to the point of requesting information for 'internal 
affairs' and stating the officers 'were not invited inside the house."' 
Since defendant admits, and the evidence is uncontradicted, that 
he initially consented to the police presence in the entryway, 
defendant's subsequent statement that officers were not invited 
inside the house apparently meant that the officers were not invited 
to enter further inside the house past the entryway. A typical 
reasonable person would not have understood these statements to 
be a revocation of consent. 
(R., Vol. 11, p.190 (citations omitted, emphasis in original).) 
Indeed, in light of the fact that Meadows did give the officer consent to the 
enter the house, but expressly limited that consent to the entryway area, his 
subsequent agitation, and comment that "I didn't invite you into the house," 
appear, from the perspective of a reasonable person, to be a reassertion of the 
limited scope of the consent, rather than an unequivocal revocation of all 
consent. Certainly, this was equivocal language which could, at worst, be 
construed in several different ways. 
The district court correctly found that Meadows failed to show that he 
unequivocally revoked the consent he gave the responding officers to enter the 
apartment. Meadows has thus failed to show that the district court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress. 
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D. Meadows Failed To Preserve His Claim That The Officers Exceeded The 
Scope Of His Consent 
The general rule in Idaho is that an appellate court will not consider an 
alleged error on appeal in the absence of a timely objection at trial. State v. 
Norton, 151 Idaho 176, _, 254 P.3d 77, 81 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. 
Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 634, 977 P.2d 890, 896 (1999). Further, 'T~or an 
objection to be preserved for appellate review, the specific ground for the 
objection must be clearly stated." State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 880, 11 P.3d 
494, 499 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing LR. 103(a)(1 ); State v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 
586, 592, 944 P.2d 721, 727 (Ct. App. 1997)). "Objecting to the admission of 
evidence on one basis does not preserve a separate and different basis for 
exclusion of the evidence." ~ (citing State v. Higgins, 122 Idaho 590, 596, 836 
P.2d 536, 542 (1992); Gleason, 130 Idaho at 592,944 P.2d at 727). 
An exception to these principles exists if the alleged error constitutes 
fundamental error. State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010). 
However, the burden of demonstrating fundamental error rests squarely with the 
defendant asserting the error for the first time on appeal. ~ at 228, 245 P.3d at 
980; State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,717,215 P.3d 414,437 (2009). To carry 
that burden, a defendant claiming error for the first time on appeal must 
demonstrate that the error he alleges "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to 
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whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
While Meadows challenged the admission of evidence associated with his 
arrest by filing a motion to suppress, the motion was limited to two grounds: 
whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Meadows, and whether 
Meadows unequivocally revoked his consent to allow the officers into his 
apartment. (R., Vol. 11, pp.177-192; Tr., p.8, L.5 - p.44, L.5.) Assertion of these 
grounds for suppression, however, did not preserve Meadows' claim on appeal 
that the responding officers also exceeded the scope of Meadows' consent by 
arresting him in the living room. That ground was not presented to the district 
court, who did not have the opportunity to consider it. Therefore, Meadows must 
show that the district court's failure to address this ground constituted 
fundamental error. 
However, because Meadows has not even asserted fundamental error, 
much less attempted to carry his burden of demonstrating it, this Court must 
decline to consider the merits of Meadows' claim. Even if Meadows had 
specifically asserted fundamental error, he would be unable to demonstrate it in 
this case. Since this issue of the scope of the consent was not developed below, 
Meadows cannot affirmatively show either that his constitutional rights were 
violated, that any error plainly exists on the available record, or that any error 
was not harmless. 
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Because Meadows failed to preserve this issue for appellate review, this 
Court should not consider it. 
E. Even If The Officers' Arrest Of Meadows Was Conducted In Violation of 
The Fourth Amendment, The Officers Did Not Exploit Any Illegality To 
Obtain Evidence To Support The Burglary And Concealment Of Evidence 
Charges 
Even where an appellant shows error, a conviction will nonetheless be 
affirmed if the appellate court concludes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there 
is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. State v. 
Eby, 136 Idaho 534, 539, 37 P.3d 625, 630 (Ct. App. 2001). In this case, 
because no evidence subject to suppression was actually admitted at Meadows' 
trial, this Court may conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that even if the district 
court erred in denying Meadows' motion to suppress, such error had no effect on 
the trial and was therefore harmless. 
Not all evidence uncovered by police who have in some way acted 
contrary to the Fourth Amendment is subject to suppression; on the contrary, 
only that evidence acquired through exploitation of the primary illegality is subject 
to the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule requires exclusion of evidence 
only if there is a factual nexus between the illegal conduct of state agents and the 
evidence sought to be suppressed. State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184, 125 
P .3d 536, 540 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Babb, 136 Idaho 95, 98, 29 P .3d 406, 
409 (Ct. App. 2005). 
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Here there was no exploitation of the alleged illegality of the arrest, and no 
factual nexus between the alleged illegal arrest and any of the evidence 
supporting the burglary and felony concealing of evidence convictions. Those 
charges were supported at trial by: (1) eyewitness testimony of the victim and 
party attendees, with whom the officer spoke prior to his contact with Meadows; 
(2) property belonging to Fredrickson discovered in Meadows' vehicle, which was 
recovered after police obtained a search warrant; and (3) property belonging to 
Fredrickson discovered in the apartment complex and community dumpster. 
(See generally, Tr.) The officers did not obtain any additional corroborative 
evidence supporting these criminal charges as the result of their contact with 
Meadows, before or after the arrest. 2 Meadows did not make any inculpatory 
admissions to officers, and no contraband was found inside Meadows' 
apartment. (Tr., p.199, Ls.8-20; p.252, L.5 - p.254, L.15; p.260, Ls.11-14.) 
Even if the officers arrested Meadows in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, Meadows has failed to identify any evidence that was acquired 
through exploitation of that alleged illegality, and no such evidence is apparent 
2 Further, evidence that Meadows physically resisted the arrest would be 
admissible to support a charge of obstructing an officer. State v. Richardson, 95 
Idaho 446, 451, 511 P.2d 263 (1973) (a citizen may not use force to resist 
peaceful arrest by an authorized peace officer performing his duties, regardless 
of whether the arrest is illegal); see also State v. Lusby, 146 Idaho 506, 198 P.3d 
735 (Ct. App. 2008). In this case, the officers did not derive evidence of 
Meadow's new criminal conduct of obstruct and delay from an exploitation of any 
illegal seizure. See State v. Mayorga, 876 S.W.2d 176, 177-178 (Tx. App. 1994) 
(evidence that a person resisted arrest is normally outside the field of exploitation 
because the arresting officer cannot foresee whether the person he sets out to 
arrest will resist). 
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from the record. Because Meadows had identified no evidence that would have 
been suppressed had he actually demonstrated a violation of his rights, and 
because no evidence that would have been subject to suppression was admitted 
at the trial, any error in denying the suppression motion is necessary harmless. 
11. 
Meadows Has Failed To Show That The Evidence Supporting His Conviction For 
Felony Concealment of Evidence Was Insufficient To Prove His Guilt 
A. Introduction 
Meadows contends there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's 
verdict finding him guilty of felony concealment of evidence. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.15-20.) A review of the record, however, shows the jury verdict was 
supported by substantial evidence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); 
State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting this 
review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the 
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 
607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991 ). 
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Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed 
in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607. 
Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001. 
C. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence To Prove The Essential 
Elements Of Felony Concealment Of Evidence 
A conviction for felony concealment of evidence requires the state to 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, and in relevant part, that the defendant had 
the specific intent to prevent the evidence from being "produced, used or 
discovered as evidence upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation." I.C. 
§ 18-2603. 
In this case, the state presented evidence that Fredrickson and the 
responding officer located papers and envelopes containing Fredrickson's name, 
and a photo depicting Fredrickson's dog, in the community trash dumpster at 
Meadows' apartment complex. (Tr., p.102, Ls.13-20; p.105, L.25 - p.109, L.1 O; 
p.154, L.14 - p.158, L.25.) During closing argument, the prosecutor pointed out 
that, for the most part, the items found in Meadows' vehicle did not have 
Fredrickson's name on them, while the items found in the dumpster either 
contained Frederickson's name, or were otherwise self-identifying as belonging 
to Fredrickson (e.g., the photo of his dog). (Augmented Tr., p.89, L.8 - p.91, 
L.1.) The prosecutor asked the jurors to make the reasonable inference that 
Meadows had concealed and discarded the items with Fredrickson's name on 
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them in the community dumpster, outside of his apartment and outside of his 
vehicle, for the purpose of concealing his connection with the crime. (Id.) 
On appeal, Meadows simply provides an alternate inference - that 
Meadows discarded the envelopes, papers, and photo, because they were 
worthless. (Appellant's brief, pp.18-20.) While this inference may also be 
reasonable, an appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to 
the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 
292,955 P.2d at 607; Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,822 P.2d 998. 
Meadows has failed to establish that the state presented insufficient 
evidence to support the jury's verdict finding him guilty of felony concealment of 
evidence. This Court should thus affirm the conviction. 
111. 
Meadows Has Failed To Show That The District Court Utilized Facts Not Found 
By The Jury To Increase The Statutory Maximum Penalty For The Concealing 
Evidence Charge In Violation Of Apprendi v. New Jersey 
A. Introduction 
Meadows contends, for the first time on appeal, that even if the state 
presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict finding him guilty of 
concealment of evidence, the district court improperly enhanced the charge from 
a misdemeanor to a felony without the requisite jury findings, in violation of 
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Apprendi v. New Jersey.3 (Appellant's brief, pp.21-23.) Essentially, Meadows 
claims that the district court erred by failing to properly instruct the jury on the 
elements that enhance the concealment of evidence charge to a felony. (Id.) 
However, a review of the record reveals that the jury was properly instructed on 
all of the necessary elements of felony concealment of evidence. Meadows has 
thus failed to show error, let alone fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, _, 261 
P.3d 853, 864-865 (2011 ); State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 147, 233 P.3d 71, 78 
(2010) (citing State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 372, 64 P.3d 296, 298 (2002)). "An 
erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the instructions as 
a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party." Draper, 151 Idaho at_, 261 
P.3d at 865 (quoting State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, _, 247 P.3d 582, 
600-01 (2010)). 
3 In his appellant's brief, Meadows also makes the conclusory assertion that 
Meadows' 12-year unified sentence for concealing evidence exceeds the 
statutory maximum for that crime and is thus illegal. (Appellant's brief, p.17.) 
Presumably, Meadows contends that the concealment charge was not properly 
enhanced by the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. The state does 
not respond to this contention because Meadows does not support it with 
argument or authority, State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 
(1996) ("When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, 
authority, or argument, they will not be considered"), and because it is not stated 
in the "Issues" section of his brief. See I.AR. 35(a)(4). Meadows, of course, 
may make a motion with the trial court to correct an illegal sentence at any time. 
I.C.R. 35(a). 
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C. The District Court Properly Instructed The Jury 
Concealment of evidence is a misdemeanor offense unless "[t]he 
defendant knew that an object was about to be produced, used, or discovered as 
evidence in any legally authorized trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation 
involving a felony offense." State v. Peteia, 139 Idaho 607, 610, 83 P.3d 781, 
784 (Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added); see also LC. § 18-2603. Whether an 
investigation "involves a felony offense" depends upon whether the evidence that 
was destroyed, altered, or concealed would have tended to demonstrate the 
commission of a felony. Peteia, 139 Idaho at 612, 83 P.3d at 786. 
In this case, the jury was instructed that in order to find Meadows guilty of 
felony concealment of evidence, the state must prove, in relevant part, that "the 
[d]efendant, Dupree Lamar Meadows, knowing that certain items were about to 
be produced or used or discovered as evidence in a burglary inquiry or 
investigation or proceeding or trial ... did willfully conceal the same with the intent 
to prevent it from being produced or used or discovered." (R., Vol. II, p.311 
(emphasis added).) 
Meadows contends that this instruction omitted the required elements of 
criminal investigation and felony offense, because "[w]hile burglary is mentioned, 
even assuming arguendo that the jury could find this to be an investigation that is 
criminal in nature, there is nothing in the evidence presented to it from which the 
jury could find that it was a felony (regardless of what the bench and bar may 
know.)" (Appellant's brief, pp.21-23.) Therefore, argues Meadows, the jury only 
19 
found facts establishing that Meadows was guilty of misdemeanor concealment 
of evidence, and by entering a felony sentence, the district court exceeded the 
maximum sentence warranted by the facts reflected in the jury verdict, thus 
causing an Apprendi violation.4 (Id.) 
However, Meadows concedes on appeal that he did not object at trial to 
the jury instructions. (Appellant's brief, p.29; also Tr., p.264, Ls.2-10.) His 
claim that the district court improperly instructed the jury is, therefore, not 
preserved and may not be considered for the first time on appeal absent a 
showing of fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 225, 245 P.3d at 977; State v. 
Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 748, 170 P.3d 886, 891 (2007). Meadows has failed 
to show error, let alone fundamental error. 
Because the jury was properly instructed on the felony concealing 
evidence charge, Meadows has failed to satisfy the first element of Perry, that 
one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional rights were violated. Perry, 150 
Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. The jury was specifically instructed that the 
evidence Meadows concealed had to pertain to a burglary inquiry or investigation 
or proceeding at trial. (R., Vol. 11, p.311.) Whether the jury was specifically 
aware that burglary was a felony is inconsequential. By finding that the evidence 
4 Any fact that increases a sentence beyond its statutory maximum must be 
submitted to jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Under Apprendi and its progeny, the statutory 
maximum is "the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of 
the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-304 (2004). 
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at issue pertained to a burglary inquiry, it necessarily found that the evidence 
pertained to a felony criminal inquiry. 5 
Meadows further cites to Peteia to support his contention (Appellant's 
brief, p.22), however that case is easily distinguished from the present case. The 
state charged Peteja with felony concealment of evidence. Peteja, 139 Idaho at 
609, 83 P.3d at 783. At trial, the jury was instructed that in order to find Peteja 
guilty of that crime, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Peteja 
"destroyed and/or concealed a clear baggy with a white powder substance" and 
"knew said baggy was about to be produced, used or discovered as evidence in 
an investigation authorized by law." Mt at 610-612, 83 P.3d at 784-786. The 
Idaho Court of Appeals held that these jury instructions did not fairly and 
accurately reflect the applicable law because they omitted the necessary 
elements that the investigation was "criminal in nature" and "involve[d] a felony 
offense." Mt at 608- 612, 83 P.3d at 782-786. However, the instructions in the 
present case, rather than describing conduct which did not necessarily 
demonstrate the commission of a felony, such as the "clear baggy with a white 
powder substance" instruction in Peteia, instead specifically referenced a felony 
crime, burglary. 
Meadows also cannot show that any error was "clear or obvious, without 
the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, 
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision." 
5 The jury instructions of course, also defined burglary, since Meadows was 
charged with that crime as well. (R., Vol. II, pp.307-310.) 
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Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Even if Meadows' counsel had 
deemed the instruction technically erroneous for failing to expressly require that 
the evidence pertained to a "felony" or "criminal" investigation, counsel may have 
deliberately chosen to forgo objecting for any number of reasons, including a 
determination that Meadows could preserve a potential appellate issue without 
prejudicing Meadows at trial. Meadows' counsel may also have wished to omit 
the potentially prejudicial term, "felony," from the jury instructions. 
Meadows has also failed to carry his burden of establishing the third prong 
of the fundamental error standard, which requires him to demonstrate that the 
error he asserts was not harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently reiterated the standard for harmless error 
applicable to claims that a jury instruction omitted an element of a charged 
offense as follows: 
[W]here the jury instructions were only partially erroneous, such as 
where the jury instructions improperly omitted one element of a 
charged offense, the appellate court may apply the harmless error 
test, and where the evidence supporting a finding on the omitted 
element is overwhelming and uncontroverted, so that no rational 
jury could have found that the state failed to prove that element, the 
constitutional violation may be deemed harmless. 
Draper, 151 Idaho at_, 261 P.3d at 868 (quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at_, 245 
P.3d at 976). See also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 17 (1999) ("[Wjhere a 
reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element 
was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury 
verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is 
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properly found to be harmless."). For the reasons set forth above, application of 
this standard to the facts of this case shows that even if it was error to omit the 
term "felony" and/or "criminal" from the elements instruction, such error was 
harmless. The jury necessarily found that Meadows willfully concealed the 
papers in the dumpster knowing that they would be utilized "in a burglary inquiry 
or investigation or proceeding or trial." (R., Vol. II, p.311.) Meadows has failed to 
demonstrate how a properly instructed jury would not have found burglary to be a 
felony or a crime. Therefore, this Court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the jury verdict would have been the same even absent the alleged error. 
Meadows has failed to carry his burden of establishing that the error was not 
harmless. His claim of instructional error, raised for the first time on appeal, 
therefore fails. 
IV. 
Meadows Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishing He Is Entitled To 
Relief Based Upon His Unpreserved Due Process Claim Of A Variance Between 
The Jury Instructions And The Facts Alleged In The Charging Document 
A. Introduction 
Meadows contends, for the first time on appeal, that there was a fatal 
variance between the charging document and the jury instruction with regard to 
the obstruct and delay of a police officer charge. (Appellant's brief, pp.23-31.) 
While the state concedes that a variance existed, the record reveals that it did 
not rise to the level of fundamental error. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 147, 233 
P.3d 71, 78 (2010) (citing State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 372, 64 P.3d 296, 298 
(2002)). Whether there is a variance between a charging document and the jury 
instructions at trial, and whether such variance is fatal to the conviction, are also 
questions of law given free review on appeal. State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56, 
57, 951 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Ct. App. 1998). 
C. Because Meadows Failed To Obiect Below, His Claim Of A Variance Has 
Not Been Preserved For Appeal, And He Has Failed To Show He Is 
Entitled To Review Under The Fundamental Error Doctrine 
"A variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts 
different from those alleged in the indictment." Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 
100, 105 (1979). A variance also occurs where the jury instructions given at trial 
allow the jury to convict the defendant of the charged crime, but on one or more 
alternative theories than alleged in the charging document. See, ~. State v. 
Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 716 P.2d 1182 (1985). 
A variance between a charging document and a jury instruction or the 
evidence adduced at trial requires reversal only when it deprives the defendant of 
his substantial rights by violating the defendant's right to fair notice or leaving him 
or her open to the risk of double jeopardy. State v. Wolfrum, 145 Idaho 44, 47, 
175 P.3d 206, 209 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 49, 89 P.3d 
881, 889 (Ct. App. 2003); Windsor, 110 Idaho at 417-18, 716 P.2d at 1189-90. A 
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defendant is deprived of fair notice only if he was misled or embarrassed in the 
preparation or presentation of his defense. State v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178, 
182, 191 P.3d 1098, 1103 (2008). 
Further, and as discussed above, "[i]t is a fundamental tenet of appellate 
law that a proper and timely objection must be made in the trial court before an 
issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 
76 (Ct. App. 2000); see also Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976, 
("Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for 
appeal through an objection at trial."). 
Meadows concedes on appeal that he did not object at trial to the jury 
instructions on the obstruct and delay charge. (Appellant's brief, p.29; see also 
Tr., p.264, Ls.2-10.) His claim that those instructions impermissibly varied from 
the allegations of the charging document and the evidence adduced at trial is, 
therefore, not preserved and may not be considered for the first time on appeal 
absent a showing of fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 225, 245 P.3d at 
977; State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 748, 170 P.3d 886, 891 (2007). 
The state concedes that there was a variance in this case. The amended 
charging information alleged that Meadows willfully resisted and/or obstructed a 
public officer(s) "by knowingly mak[ing] a false report to the officers." (R., Vol. II, 
p.236.) At trial, the jury instructions advised the jury of this charge and the 
alleged facts in nearly identical language. (R., Vol. II, p.294.) However, the jury 
instructions also contained the pattern jury instructions for obstruct and delay -
25 
that in order to find Meadows guilty of that crime, the state must prove that 
Meadows "resisted and/or obstructed and/or delayed a public officer" "in the 
discharge of or attempt to discharge a duty of his office." (R., Vol. II, p 311 ;6 see 
also ICJI 1260.) Thus, the jury instruction, while a correct statement of the law, 
allowed the jury to find Meadows guilty of obstruct and delay using an alternative 
theory than alleged in the charging document - that Meadows physically resisted 
arrest. Further, at trial, the state presented evidence supporting this theory. (Tr., 
p.63, L.11 - p.64, L.3; p.99, L.19 - p.101, L.14; p.173, Ls.7-20; p.220, Ls.1-14; 
p.221, Ls.1-14). 
Applying the appropriate standards to this case, however, reveals 
Meadows has failed to carry his burden of establishing a variance of 
constitutional significance that requires reversal. Meadows does not contend 
that the alleged variance leaves him exposed to double jeopardy, and he has 
failed to demonstrate from the record that the variance actually prejudiced the 
preparation of his defense. There is no indication in the record that, had 
Meadows been provided the notice he claims the instructions deprived him of he 
would have conducted his cross-examinations of the state's witnesses any 
6 Jury Instruction #22, which instructed the jury on the elements of obstruct and 
delay, appears on an unnumbered page between pages 311 and 312 of Volume 
11 of the clerk's record. 
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differently, or that he would have presented a different theory of his case at trial. 7 
Meadows has thus failed to satisfy the first element of Perry, that one or more of 
[his] unwaived constitutional rights were violated. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 
P.3d at 980. 
The second element of a claim of fundamental error is that the alleged 
error is "clear or obvious, without the need for any additional information not 
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure 
to object was a tactical decision." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 
(foot-note omitted). Meadows cannot satisfy this element because he cannot 
show from the appellate record that he would have conducted his defense 
differently, as explained above. Likewise, he has failed to show that the decision 
of his trial counsel to not object to the jury instructions defining obstruct and delay 
was based on ignorance of the law or other objective shortcomings, as opposed 
to being merely a tactical decision. 
The final element of a claim of fundamental error requires Meadows to 
"demonstrate that the error affected [his] substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. As previously indicated, a variance 
affects the substantial rights of a defendant only "when it deprives the defendant 
of his right to fair notice or leaves him open to the risk of double jeopardy." State 
7 Meadows' defense to the obstructing an officer charge at trial was that in light of 
the early morning hour of the police arrival and the surprise of the situation, 
Meadows' conduct with the officers did not constitute a willful obstruction of 
officers. (Augmented Tr., p.106, L. 7 - p.108, L.22.) 
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v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 165, 90 P.3d 910, 915 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing 
\Vindsor, 110 Idaho at 417-78, 716 P.2d 1189-90 (footnote omitted)). For the 
reasons already explained, Meadows has failed to demonstrate that his 
substantial rights were affected by the variance he claims for the first time on 
appeal and has, therefore, failed to satisfy the final element of the Perry 
fundamental error analysis. 
Meadows has failed to show fundamental error in the jury instructions and, 
as such, has failed to show any basis for reversal of his conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Meadows' convictions 
for burglary, felony concealment of evidence, and the persistent violator 
sentencing enhancement. 
DATED this 14th day of February 2012. 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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